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HOLTON V. CITY OF THOMASVILLE SCH. DIST.
425 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)
FACTS
Until 1965, the City of Thomasville School District (the District) in
Georgia operated a de jure segregated school system with two elementary
schools for Black students, four elementary schools for white students, one
high school for Black students and another for white students.' In 1965, the
District implemented its first desegregation plan, permitting parents to
choose which school their children would attend.2 This method failed to
accomplish any desegregation.3 After communicating with the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the District adopted a new plan in
1970 to create a single high school, a single middle school, and four
elementary schools, among which parents could choose to send their
children.4 HEW accepted the plan in 1970, finding that it would accomplish
the purposes of Title VI. 5  The District continues to maintain this school
structure.6
Shernika Holton, the Thomas County NAACP, and ten other
representative parents of Black children attending elementary, middle, and
high schools in the District brought a lawsuit alleging the District failed to
meet its constitutional obligation to desegregate the schools.7  They
requested judicial supervision of the District's desegregation efforts.8 The
district court granted Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment,
I Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11 th Cir. 2005); Black's Law
Dictionary 1388 (8th ed. 2004). De jure segregation is segregation permitted by law. Id. De facto
segregation is segregation occurring without state authority, usually on the basis of socioeconomic factors.
Id.
2 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1330.
3 Id.
4 See id. (stating that the plan originally created a single high school, a single middle school, a
single school for all sixth grade students and a single school for all fifth grade students, but eventually the
District reconfigured the schools into one high school and one middle school).
5 Id.
6 See id. (stating that one of the traditionally black elementary schools closed in 2002).
7 Id. at 1328. The district court certified a class action lawsuit of "all present and future parents
or guardians of African American children enrolled or eligible to be enrolled within the Thomasville City
School District." Id at 1329 (quoting Thomas County Branch of NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch.
Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690, 700 (M.D. Ga. 1999)). Plaintiffs brought the claim under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Id.
The district court and the Eleventh Circuit treated the two causes of action as being coextensive. Id. at
1329 n.1.
8 See id. at 1328-29 ("The Plaintiff' seek a permanent injunction requiring the District to (a)
disestablish its racially segregated school system; (b) adopt and implement a plan effectively to
desegregate its buildings and classrooms; (c) provide equal educational facilities, resources, materials, and
instruction to all students, and to provide compensatory instruction to students previously denied that
opportunity; (d) cease all discriminatory imposition of discipline; and (e) desegregate all student activities,
and cease discrimination against black students in this area.").
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presuming that any present racial imbalances stemmed from the District's
previous de jure segregation. 9 After a bench trial, the district court also
examined the District's facilities, transportation services, and extracurricular
activities but found no racial imbalances present.'0 Thus, the court found the
District had satisfied its constitutional obligation to desegregate."
HOLDING
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision to decline making a unitary status finding. 12 Additionally, the court
upheld the factual findings, 13 the burden of proof placed on the District,14 and
the standard used to determine the existence of intentional discrimination.
5
The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that the district court failed to apply
the correct standard when analyzing the constitutionality of the District's
ability-groups or tracking practices and remanded the case for
reconsideration of the issue. 16  )t
ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs raised five issues on appeal. 17 The Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the district court's findings of fact for clear error and reviewed de
novo the district court's interpretation and application of the law.' 8  The
analysis began with a brief summary of school desegregation law.
Although all de jure segregated school systems do not have to
eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination to the maximum extent
possible,' 9 they do have an affirmative constitutional obligation to
desegregate by taking all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the
unconstitutional dejure system to the extent practicable.20 If a school fails to
9 Id. at 1329.
10 Id. at 1336.
11 Id. at 1328.
12 Id. at 1340.
13 Id. at 1352.
14 Id. at 1346.
15 Id. at 1348.
16 Id. at 1346.
17 Id. at 1336.
18 Id. at 1337.
19 Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995)).
20 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (finding all de jure segregated school systems under a constitutional obligation to
desegregate); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992) (defining a district's duty to desegregate as
eliminating the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (explaining that a de jure district has an affirmative duty "to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch") (quoting Green v.
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meet this obligation, the courts have broad power to intervene to the extent of
the constitutional violation.2' To determine if a school district has eradicated
prior de jure segregation, courts must consider any racial imbalance in a
school's faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, facilities and
student attendance patterns. Racial imbalances stem from comparing "the
proportion of majority to minority students in individual schools with the
proportions of the races in the district as a whole. '23 If the court finds racial
imbalances exist, the burden shifts to the school district to show that the
imbalances are not from past de jure or present intentional discrimination. 24
In this case, the parties refer to the burden shifting as the "Keyes
presumption, ''2 5 stemming from the Supreme Court's opinion in Keyes v.
School District No. 1.26 One way the school district can meet its burden is to
attribute the racial imbalances to demographic forces.2 7 Proving that
demographic factors are a substantial cause of the racial imbalance
overcomes the Keyes presumption and no constitutional violation exists.
2 8
Additionally, once a district remedies racial imbalances from the de jure
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)); Manning ex rel. Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927,
943 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that a district need only eliminate the vestiges of discrimination "to the
extent practicable") (quoting Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 839, 842 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
21 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1337. ("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies.") (quoting Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 15).
22 Id. at 1337-38 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435) (listing specific facets of a school system courts
must examine to determine if the district eliminated past discrimination); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 486
(stating that the facets listed in Green must be free from racial discrimination before the Constitutional
obligation to desegregate is met).
23 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 474).
24 Id. (citing Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 26 (explaining that racial
imbalances in a prior de jure segregated district shifts the burden of proof to the district); Freeman 503
U.S. at 494 (stating that the in a prior de jure segregated school system, the school district bears the
burden of showing that current imbalances are not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation)).
25 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1338 n.8.
26 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (finding that the deliberate
segregation of one school area can prove a segregation policy in the entire school district). In Keyes, the
Supreme Court considered whether proof of intentional segregation of a portion of a school district was
sufficient to prove segregation of the entire school district. Id. at 200. No statute ever proscribed or
permitted segregation in the Denver school district, but the School Board manipulated the policies causing
segregation in a certain area. Id. at 191. The district court intervened to desegregate one area of the
school district, but petitioners sought the court's intervention for all the schools in the district. Id. at 192.
The Court affirmed that where no de jure segregation has ever existed, plaintiffs must prove that
segregation exists, and that intentional state action caused or maintained it. id. at 198. The Court held
that a "finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school
system ... creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious."
Id. at 208. In other words, in cases where the court finds that school authorities intentionally segregated
part of a school system, the school authorities bear the burden of showing that their actions regarding the
other segregated schools in the district were not motivated by segregative intent. Id. at 208-09.
27 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1338.
28 See id. at 1339 (stating that if demographic factors substantially caused the racial imbalances,
the presumption that segragative intent is the cause is overcome, and no constitutional violation exists)
(citing Manning ex rel. Manning, 244 F.3d at 944).
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violation, no further duty exists to remedy segregation caused by
demographic factors. 29 A school district need not prove that demographics
are the sole cause of the racial imbalances. 30 To preserve the presumption of
de jure segregation, the plaintiff must show the demographic shift resulted
from the dejure system or some other discriminatory conduct.
31
Plaintiffs claimed that the district court failed to determine whether
the District achieved "unitary status.'3 2  Lower courts use the term unitary
status inconsistently to mean a district that has met its constitutional
obligation to desegregate or to mean a school that has desegregation plans
though past vestiges of the segregation might still exist.33  The Eleventh
Circuit found no error in the district court's decision not to determine
whether unitary status exists for two reasons.34 First, courts usually only
assess unitary status to decide when to end judicial supervision of
desegregation, 35 but in this case, no court has supervised the District's
desegregation.36 Thus, the court reasoned no unitariness analysis is
applicable.37 Second, the substance of the inquiry is more important than the
terminology.38  However, if the district court inquires into whether the
District eliminated the vestiges of the prior de jure segregation system, the
terminology used to phrase the inquiry is immaterial.39
Next, Plaintiffs argued that the district court misapplied the Keyes
presumption. 4° Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the court failed to require
the District to demonstrate (1) that it eliminated the vestiges of segregation to
the extent practicable, (2) that its policies did not contribute to the
29 Id. at 1338 (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494) (explaining that if a district remedies racial
imbalance from the de jure violation, then the court does not require it to remedy imbalances from
demographic factors); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 31-32 (stating that after a
district's Constitutional obligation to desegregate is met, courts should not intervene to fix the racial
composition of a school without proof that the district deliberately fixed or altered the demographic
patterns)).
30 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1339 ("[A] plaintiff does not undermine the strength of a defendant's
demographic evidence by merely asserting that demographics alone do not explain the racial imbalances."
(quoting Manning ex rel. Manning, 244 F.3d at 944-45).
31 Id. (citing Manning ex. rel. Manning, 244 F.3d at 944-45).
32 Id.






39 See id. at 1340 ("The district court's opinion makes clear that it found that the defendants had
eliminated the vestiges of their prior discrimination; thus, it is wholly irrelevant what precise language the
district court used to announce its findings.") (quoting Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d
1416, 1424 n. 9 (1l th Cir. 1992).
40 Id. at 1340; see Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (holding that "a finding of intentionally segregative
school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system ... creates a presumption that other
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious").
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imbalances, and (3) that demographic changes were a substantial cause of the
racial imbalance.4'
Regarding part one, the Eleventh Circuit found that while the district
court did not use the terminology "to the extent practicable," its detailed
finding illustrates the substance of the court's inquiry was correct.42 The
district court properly focused on whether the vestiges of the previous de
jure system still existed by evaluating student assignments, facilities, faculty
and staff assignments, transportation and extracurricular activities,
curriculum and class assignments, gifted and special education programs and
discipline system for racial imbalances.43 In the areas where the district
court found racial imbalance, it examined whether the District had proved by
a preponderance of the evidence the imbalances are not traceable to past
segregation.44 The court found the imbalances stemmed from demographic
or other external factors.45 Then the court looked for present purposeful
discrimination in those areas and found none.46 Thus, the district court's
analysis trackedrprecisely the methodology prescribed by the Supreme Court
for determining whether a school district has satisfied its constitutional
obligation to desegregate even though the District did not use the phrase "to
the extent practicable. '47 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a finding that
imbalances are not traceable to past de jure segregation is a finding that the
vestiges of dejure segregation were eliminated to the extent practicable. a
Regarding part two, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that the District
bears the burden of showing that present racial imbalances are not traceable
in a proximate way to the past segregation, 49 which was the standard applied
by the district court. 50 The District is not required to prove that its policies
do not contribute to the current racial imbalances. 51  The latter standard
comes from Keyes,52 which involved a school district trying to prove that an
entire school system was not infected with intentional segregation after the
41 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1340.
42 Id. at 1341.
43 Id. at 1342 (citing Thomas County Branch of NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299




47 Id. at 1342-43.
48 Id. at 1342.
49 Id. at 1343 ("The school district bears the burden of showing that any current [racial]
imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.") (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at
494).
50 Id. (citing Thomas County Branch of NAACP, 299 F. Supp 2d at 1352).
51 Id. at 1344.
52 Id. at 1343; see Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (holding that "a finding of intentionally segregative
school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious").
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court found intentional discrimination in some of the system's schools.53
Here, the entire district concededly was segregated.54  Thus, the court
concluded that the standard was inapplicable to the case at bar. The court
further stated that even if the presumption applied, the District only had to
prove either that its policies were not intentional or that its policies were not
factors in causing the imbalance.56 The district court found intentional
discrimination did not cause the imbalances, and thus, did not need to
consider the other factor.
Regarding part three, the Eleventh Circuit found that while the
district court did not say that demographic factors substantially caused the
racial balances, its detailed analysis and findings indicate this.58 The district
court relied on data showing that for the first six years after adopting the
second desegregation plan, the District's schools "closely tracked" the racial
composition of the District as a whole.59 Further data showed a decline in
the number of white students enrolled and population shifts in Thomasville.
6
0
Relying on this information, the district court concluded that demographic
changes caused the present imbalances. 61 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
Plaintiffs failed to show otherwise.
62
Plaintiffs further argued that the district court failed to apply the
correct standard when analyzing the constitutionality of the District's ability-
groups or tracking practices.63 Plaintiffs stated that precedent permits
tracking only when it "is not based on the present results of past segregation
or will remedy such results through better educational opportunities. "64 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed that the district court committed a reversible error by
failing to apply this standard.65 The court reasoned that abilitygrouping is
not per se unconstitutional even if it causes racial imbalances, but found
that the judiciary must ask if the tracking is based on the present results of
past discrimination or is designed to remedy such results.67 The district court





58 Id. at 1344.
59 Id. at 1345 (citing Thomas County Branch of NAACP, 299 F. Supp 2d at 1355).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1346.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (quoting Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1414
( lIth Cir. 1985)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1346-47 (citing Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1981)).
67 Id. at 1347.
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only analyzed the tracking for intentional discrimination. 68 The Eleventh
Circuit remanded this issue.
69
Plaintiffs further argued that the district court failed to apply a
standard for determining whether the District has present intentional
discrimination.7 ° Plaintiffs argue that the court should ask whether race is a
substantial motivating factor behind the District's actions.7' The Eleventh
Circuit agreed that the district court could have articulated its standard more
clearly but found no error in the substance of the district court's inquiry and
finding.72 To establish a present intent to discriminate, the plaintiffs must
prove that the District acted with a discriminatory purpose.73 According to
the court, a discriminatory purpose ". . . implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker...
selected . . .a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 74 The
district court conducted this inquiry when it examined the evidence to see if
the District acteft because of race.75 This is a factual inquiry, and the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it cannot reverse the district court's
finding regarding intentional discrimination unless it is a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or based on an erroneous view of the law.76 The court found
no erroneous view of the law of intentional discrimination in this case.77
Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that the district court's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous because the evidence did not show significant demographic
changes, and the District could have counteracted the shifts by implementing
attendance zones.78 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the standard of
review of the district court's findings of fact is clearly erroneous, 79 and the
Plaintiffs only presented an alternative view of the evidence not an error.80
The court found that the district court thoroughly evaluated the evidence, and
8 Id.




73 Id. at 1349.
74 Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).
75 Id. at 1350.
76 Id. (quoting Barber v. Int'l Bd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers &
Helpers, 778 F.2d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 1985)).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. ("If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in
its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact it would have weighed the evidence differently.") (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C.,
470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).so Id. at 135 1.
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its theory was more than plausible, despite conflicting evidence. 8'
Additionally, the court noted that courts may not intervene to maintain racial
balance without a constitutional violation.82 A private choice to resegregate
has no constitutional implications. 83 Thus, the district court cannot rearrange
attendance zones to achieve greater racial balance without exceeding its
authority.84
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit takes a functional approach to school
desegregation case law by refusing to strike down several of the district
court's findings simply because the court did not use certain terminology in
its opinion. This logic seems consistent with reasoning from the Supreme
Court. For example, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, the Supreme Court
explained that "it is a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if
they were actually found in the Constitution. The constitutional command of
the Fourteenth Amendment is that '[n]o State shall... deny to any person..
• the equal protection of the laws.' ''85 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that if the district court applies the correct substantive judicial inquiries to a
school desegregation case, it is not required to find that the school achieved
"unitary status., 86
The Eleventh Circuit used the same reasoning to equate the district
court's finding that racial imbalances were not traceable to past
discrimination with a finding that the vestiges of past de jure discrimination
have been eliminated to the extent practicable.87 As the Eleventh Circuit
indicated, the district court's failure to use the phrase "to the extent
practicable" in its opinion hardly seems noteworthy when the substance of
the inquiry is correct. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit equated the district
court's findings that demographic changes were responsible for the racial
imbalances with a finding that the demographic factors were a "substantial
cause of the racial imbalances," although the court never used those words.88
The district court probably should mention the tests articulated by
the Supreme Court for deciding school segregation cases, however, to distill
any question about the level of scrutiny applied. The word "substantial"
could indicate a higher burden for the school district. The Eleventh Circuit's
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1352.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1353.
85 Id. at 1340 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991)).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1341-42.
Ns Id. at 1346.
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decision not to remand the case for a technical violation as opposed to a
substantive one seems reasonable, however, because the reference to
"responsible" indicates that demographic forces were the sole cause instead
of merely a cause of the racial imbalances.
The Eleventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of Keyes also seems in
accordance with the Supreme Court's reasoning. When considering what, if
any, burden of proof the District must bear, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished the burden shifted in Keyes from the burden shifted in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education89 and Freeman v. Pitts.90  In
Swann and Freeman, the Supreme Court found that in a prior de jure school
system, the school district bears the burden of showing that any current racial
imbalances are not traceable to a past or prior violation.91 In Keyes, on the
other hand, a formally dual school system had never existed, but rather
plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the part of the school board in
implementing its facially neutral policies.92 The Supreme Court stated that
where the plaintiffs proved intentional discrimination in a portion of the
schools within a district, the burden shifts to the district to prove that the
other segregated schools in the system are not also the result of the
intentionally segregative actions.93 The Court seems to limit the burden shift
in Keyes to fact-specific cases, instead of generally shifting the burden of
proof in cases involving current intentional discrimination. Thus, in this
case, the District bore no extra burden to disprove current intentional
discrimination; plaintiffs still carried the heavy burden to demonstrate that
89 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (finding that the district
court has broad powers to eliminate vestiges of past discrimination in prior de jure school districts). In
Swann, the State previously had a policy to separate pupils in schools solely based on race but failed to
create an acceptable plan to integrate the school system. Id. at 5-6. The Court found that where a school
failed to come forward with a plan, the district court may make limited use of ratios of white to black
students in shaping a remedy, that pairing and grouping noncontiguous school zones was permissible, and
that ordering a system of busing was allowed where assigning children to the school nearest their home
would not dismantle the dual system. Id. at 26, 28, 30. The Court affirmed that in a system where formal
desegregation existed, the school district had a duty to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation in violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 14. The Court reasoned that
the district courts have broad power to fashion a remedy to accomplish this objective, which was not
restricted by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 16-17.
90 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1338 n.8; Freeman, 503 U.S. 467 (finding that a district court can
gradually stop supervision of a school district before it has completely eliminated all the vestiges of the de
jure system). In Freeman, the district court was overseeing the implementation of a plan to eliminate the
vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure school system. Id. at 471. The court relinquished jurisdiction
when the school had reached unitary status in some but not all areas. Id. The Supreme Court found that a
district court could relinquish supervision before full compliance had been achieved in all factors. Id. at
490. The Court reasoned that once the district court determines, inter alia, that retention of control is not
necessary to achieve compliance in all area and that the district has shown a good faith commitment to
integration, the court has discretion to make an incremental withdrawal of supervision. Id. at 491.
91 Holton, 425 F.3d at 1338.
92 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191.
93 Id. at 209.
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the district acted with discriminatory purpose. Similar to all other equal
protection claims, the District did not have to defend its policies merely
because of the racially disproportionate impact.
Perhaps in future cases involving current racial imbalances, the
school district's neutral policies will so greatly affect racial imbalance, the
court will force the district to provide a justification for its actions and
lighten the Plaintiff's burden. Arguably, however, a finding that
demographic changes caused the racial imbalances is a finding that the
District did not act with discriminatory purpose. In that context, the District
in this case, would have met any additional burden shift as well.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Amanda Thrash
